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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, courts have properly begun to hold that
video games fall within the protective scope of the First
Amendment. These decisions incorporate two distinct findings:
First, video games are a form of expression presumptively entitled
to constitutional protection. Second, they do not fall into a category
of unprotected speech such as obscenity1 or incitement.2 As a matter
of precedent and theory, these holdings are correct. Although the
Supreme Court has never isolated a single, unifying justification for
the protection of speech,3 drawing video games within the First
Amendment's protection is consistent with longstanding precedent
and promotes many of the values most commonly associated with
that provision of the Constitution. If courts are to remain faithful
to precedent, they cannot easily ignore the literary and artistic
aspects of many video games. Neither can courts avoid
acknowledging the rapidly disappearing technological and
conceptual distinction between video games and motion pictures,
which the First Amendment has protected for over fifty years.4 As
a matter of policy, protecting video games will promote an important
avenue of expression, release, and self-fulfillment from the
perspective of both creators and players.' Indeed, because of the
1 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth basic test for obscenity).
2 See Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447(1969) (per curiam) (setting forth basic test
for incitement); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam) (elaborating
on Brandenburg). The government also has the general power to regulate speech on the basis
of its content if it adopts means necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling public
interest. Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
' See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982)
("There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempt to
devise a coherent theory of free expression.').
' See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that expression
by means of motion pictures is protected by free speech and free press guarantees of First
Amendment).
' See David C. Kiernan, Note, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited upon the Father?
Video Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 207, 219-20
(2000) (recognizing video games as form of expression). Although Kiernan assumes that video
games are a form of expression, he goes on to suggest that they be treated as a form of
incitement outside the protective ambit of the First Amendment. See id. at 236
("Brandenburg was not intended to apply to the tort context and thus the lower courts have
erroneously applied this highly protective test to protect negligent media defendants."). My
position differs from Kiernan's on this latter point. See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying
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interactive nature of video games, the distinction between "creator"
and "player" in this medium may have little enduring meaning.6
Notwithstanding the apparent unanimity of the courts with
regard to the protected status of video games, several commentators
have taken the contrary position. Starting from a variety of
premises-ranging from an asserted lack of meaningful content to
claimed deleterious effects on children-these commentators
suggest that courts should adopt a more lenient, government-
friendly standard with respect to video games than that adopted for
traditional media such as books and newspapers.7 This Article
responds to these commentators; describes, defends, and to some
extent criticizes recent decisions extending constitutional protection
to video games; and identifies points courts should consider in
future decisions involving the extension of protection to new media.
The judicial project of extending constitutional protection to video
games formally began in early 2001, when the United States Court
text.
6 See DAVID KUSHNER, MASTERS OF DOOM: How Two Guys CREATED AN EMPIRE AND
TRANSFORMED POP CULTURE 165-68 (2003) (describing how "players" substantially rewrote
video game released in cyberspace); cf. Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and
User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of
Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1623-24 (1995) (discussing interactive communication
and noting that "the architecture of the network makes no distinction between users who are
information providers and those who are information users. In fact, most users play both
roles from time to time.").
' See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of
First Amendment Protection for Video Games, 57 SMU L. REV. 139, 160-61 (2004) (raising
objections to full constitutional protection for video games); Kiernan, supra note 5, at 250
(proposing broader definition of "incitement" for video games containing violent imagery); cf.
Anthony Ventry III, Note & Comment, Application of the First Amendment to Violent and
Nonviolent Video Games, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2004) (arguing that courts should
decide whether the First Amendment protects video games on "case-by-case" basis). Other
commentators have made similar proposals for a broad category of media that includes, but
is not limited to, video games. See, e.g., KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-3 (2003) (arguing for inclusion of books, films, and video games);
David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 1007 (2002)
(arguing for inclusion of commercial speech, video games, and pornography); David Crump,
Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of
the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 45-59 (1994) (finding incitement speech hidden in
music); Juliet Dee, Basketball Diaries, Natural Born Killers and School Shootings: Should
There Be Limits on Speech Which Triggers Copycat Violence?, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 713, 737
(2000) (noting violent content in a variety of media); John Charles Kunich, Natural Born
Copycat Killers and the Law of Shock Torts, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1157, 1158 (2000) (discussing
violent forms of mass entertainment).
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided American Amusement
Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick.8 This case involved a challenge to an
Indianapolis municipal ordinance that restricted minors' access to
video games.9 In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit
(per Judge Posner) concluded that the First Amendment applies to
most, if not all, video games' ° and instructed the district court to
preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the ordinance."
An unbroken series of similar holdings followed the Seventh
Circuit's decision in American Amusement, including decisions in
2002 by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, 2 the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, 3 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit (per Judge Boggs); 4 a decision in mid-2003 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (per Judge Morris
Sheppard Arnold);" and a decision in mid-2004 by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington." Thus, this
new medium currently-and perhaps ironically-enjoys
constitutional protection in much of the bread basket of the United
States and receives only scattered protection on the coasts.
7
8 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
9 Id. at 573.
10 Id. at 579-80.
1 Id. at 580.
12 See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1282 (D. Colo. 2002)
(holding that video games are protected under First Amendment).
13 See Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 182 (D. Conn. 2002) (finding
video games to be expression protected by First Amendment).
14 See James v. MeowMedia, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 699 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusing to attach
tort liability to ideas and images conveyed by video games for fear of raising constitutional
concerns).
11 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding that video games are protected form of speech under First Amendment).
16 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188-90 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (holding that law penalizing distribution of specific video games to minors
violated First Amendment under strict scrutiny).
17 This development is partially attributable to local values and partially attributable to
fate. The cases that arose in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits involved municipal ordinances
that limited minors' access to video games. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244
F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001); IDSA, 329 F.3d at 956. These ordinances reflected culturally
conservative impulses. The cases that arose in the District of Colorado and the Sixth Circuit
involved tort actions over school shootings. See James, 300 F.3d at 687 (discussing school
shooting in Paducah, Kentucky, in December 1997); Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1268
(involving school shooting in Littleton, Colorado, in April 1999). The District of Connecticut's
2005] VIDEO GAMES
It would be difficult to underestimate the importance of this
protection. Due to the controlling nature of federal law within its
scope of operation, full constitutional protection for creators of video
games may well preclude civil liability for tort actions arising from
any mishap concerning such a game."8 At the very least, First
Amendment protection would require a court to construe the law of
its jurisdiction in such a way as to avoid imposing liability.19 Thus,
a maker sued in tort would likely prevail on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Needless
to say, defendants cannot ask for better protection, inasmuch as
they would avoid liability and discovery. Similarly, a creator of
video games challenging an ordinance or statute restricting access
to such games would readily subject the ordinance or statute to
case also involved a tort action, see Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (stabbing of one child by
another), whereas the Western District of Washington's case involved a state-wide regulation
of access. Video Software Dealers Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
As this Article moves toward publication, at least two suits are pending that involve
video games and the First Amendment. One arises from a series of shootings that took place
on Interstate 40 in Tennessee in June 2003. See Hamel v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc.,
No. 28-613 (Cocke County Tenn. Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 20,2003); see also J.J. Staumbaugh, Maker
of Violent Game Sued; Fatal Cocke County Spree Draws Suit Asking Millions from Firms,
Teens'Parents, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2003, at B1 (discussing lawsuit brought
against video game manufacturers and retailers alleging that certain games inspired copycat
violence in young consumers). The other case involves a challenge to a recently enacted
Illinois statute that would restrict minors' access to certain video games. See David L.
Hudson, Jr., First Amendment Center, What's on the Horizon, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/arts/horizon.aspx?topic=arts-horizon (last visited Sept. 4,
2005) (citing Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, No. 05C-4265 (N.D. Ill. filed July
25, 2005)). See generally John Patterson & Eric Krol, Video Game Legal Fight Beginsf]
Industry, Retailers Quickly File Lawsuit on the Constitutionality of Newly Signed Law, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, July 26, 2005, at 1 (discussing constitutional and legal issues arising over
statute designed to prevent sale of certain video games to minors).
Additionally, at least one Senator has called for national restrictions on sales of certain
video games to minors. See Shihoko Goto, Clinton Joins Video Game Censoring Rally, UPI,
July 15, 2005 ("[Senator Clinton] called for enforcement of the existing video-game ratings
system by punishing retailers who sell the games to minors. She would impose a $5,000
penalty on those caught providing minors with sexually explicit and violent games.").
18 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'); see also Anderson, supra note 7, at
1004-05 ("When a First Amendment defense is invoked in a tort case, it properly raises only
one issue: Would judgment for the plaintiff.., abridge the freedom of speech or press? All
other questions.., are ancillary to that.").
"9 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (refusing to extend
jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board without clear expression of legislative intent).
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strict judicial scrutiny. In most, if not all, instances, such scrutiny
would result in the invalidation of the ordinance or statute.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I describe the
process by which the Supreme Court assigned a broad protective
scope to the First Amendment.2 ° In Part III, I detail three
prominent decisions in which courts addressed the specific question
of video games within this First Amendment framework.21 In Part
IV, I evaluate these decisions and respond to commentators who
have proposed that courts afford less than full constitutional
protection to video games.22
II. BACKGROUND
Video games and motion pictures went through almost exactly
the same metamorphosis from formal exclusion from the protective
ambit of the First Amendment to formal inclusion. As I hope to
demonstrate in this Article, this shared experience was not a
coincidence. Instead, in both cases, courts failed at first to perceive
the expressive and artistic potential of the new medium before
them, only to recognize that potential long after it had come into
fruition.2
A. MOTION PICTURES
In 1915, the Supreme Court held in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio that motion pictures were not a form
of expression eligible for constitutional protection.24 This decision
involved a review of an Ohio statute that required distributors to
submit their films to a "board of censors" before they could be
presented in the state.25 Mutual Film challenged the statute as an
improper prior restraint on speech in violation of Ohio's version of
20 See infra notes 23-73 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 74-193 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 194-275 and accompanying text.
23 With respect to motion pictures, see infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. With
respect to video games, see infra notes 74-193 and accompanying text.
24 236 U.S. 230, 243-45 (1915).
25 Id. at 240.
[Vol. 40:153158
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the First Amendment.26 As a preliminary matter, the Court had to
decide whether film was sufficiently analogous to books and
newspapers, which almost certainly would have received
protection, 27 to merit protection as a form of expression. 2' The
analogy may seem apt to modern eyes, but the Court was working
from a distinctly unmodern script, under which even plays, which
it referred to as "spectacles,"2 were considered fully subject to the
state's power to regulate for the health, morals, welfare, and safety
of the population.3" In fact, although the Mutual Film Court
acknowledged many of the attributes of motion pictures that would
cause modern thinkers to conclude that films were expressive
works, it nevertheless rejected any such conclusion:
268 Id. at 231. The provision at issue was article I, section 11, of the state's constitution.
When Mutual Film brought its action, the Supreme Court had not yet made the First
Amendment applicable to the states. (This did not occur until 1925. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding rights of free speech and free press protected under Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).) Mutual Film was therefore obliged to rest its
federal case on the Commerce Clause, arguing that Ohio's statute imposed an excessive
burden on the interstate flow of motion pictures. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 239. The Court
rejected this claim. Id. at 240.
27 See id. at 243 ("We need not pause to dilate upon the freedom of opinion and its
expression, and whether by speech, writing or printing. They are too certain to need
discussion-of such conceded value as to need no supporting praise."). This language,
however, was dictum; the Court did not actually invalidate a prior restraint on a newspaper
until 1931, six years after it first applied the First Amendment to the states. See Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (finding statute requiring prior restraint
to constitute infringement of freedom of press as guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
28 Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 242-43.
29 See id. at 243 (finding theater similar to other shows and spectacles). The Supreme
Court did not expressly hold that the First Amendment protects plays as a form of expression
until 1975. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (finding theater
includes mixing speech with live action and is subject to First Amendment protection).
'0 See Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244 ("[The police power is familiarly exercised in
granting or withholding licenses for theatrical performances as a means of their regulation.").
Under the prevailing constitutional doctrine of this period, due process protected almost any
activity with an economic or contractual foundation, unless the activity was properly subject
to regulation under the police power. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905)
(striking down statute interfering with economic liberties). As the Court noted in Lochner:
In every case that comes before this Court... the question necessarily
arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?
Id. at 56.
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It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be
regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio
Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the
country or as organs of public opinion. They are mere
representations of events, of ideas and sentiments
published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining no
doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having
power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness
and manner of exhibition.31
As this language demonstrates, the Court based its decision on four
aspects of films: (1) they are not necessarily dependent upon the
printed or spoken word; (2) they are derivative of existing media and
therefore in some sense superfluous; (3) they do not so much explain
events as depict them; and (4) they are capable of tremendous
emotional impact. As I hope to show later in this Article, many of
these same arguments, the last of which Donald Lively has
described as "fear-based,"32 have been invoked to oppose full
constitutional protection for video games.33
To give the Mutual Film Court its due, one can concede that a
First Amendment limited to protecting the conventional press is far
easier to administer than one that protects parades,34 nude
dancing, 35 and flag burning.36 Further, such a limited interpretation
has arguable value in terms of judicial restraint and majoritarian
theory.37 One can also concede that words are often far more precise
3' Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 244.
32 Donald E. Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1071, 1080 (1985).
83 See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
34 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 581 (1995) (holding parade organizer has First Amendment right to deny gay
group's participation).
" See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting nude dancing).
36 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (recognizing flag burning as protected
expression).
37 See JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 100
(1996) ("[Olne of the virtues of the argument from democratic theory is the very strong
[Vol. 40:153
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and powerful analytical tools than depictions. Indeed, one can even
concede that motion pictures work more at an emotive level than
books and newspapers, whose effects tend more toward the
cognitive. For the Mutual Film Court, this was obviously enough.
The modern analyst, however, might note the doctrinal
conservatism the Court exhibited. Although the Court recognized
the importance of protecting opinion, this recognition was limited to
expressions of opinion of a highly cognitive nature.3" By imposing
this limitation, the Court implicitly discounted the fact that one
important aspect of "expression" is its ability to move an audience.
Had the Court taken this aspect into account, perhaps it would have
concluded that its own analysis required the classification of motion
pictures as a form of expression.39
The Mutual Film era, which lasted thirty-seven years, was laid
to rest in the 1952 case of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.4" Between
Mutual Film and Joseph Burstyn, of course, lay one of Hollywood's
high plateaus, including films such as Casablanca,4 Citizen Kane,42
and The Wizard of Oz.43 These films would have likely met the
approval of Ohio's Board of Censors, but by 1952 it was apparent to
the Court that motion pictures were indeed a form of expression,
and that the distinctions between motion pictures and traditional
media noted in Mutual Film did not preclude such a classification:
protection it gives to political speech. If we define that term too broadly we will weaken the
First Amendment protection by spreading it too thin."); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 478-80 (1985) (arguing that,
by overextending constitutional protections during periods of low national tension, courts
undermine strength of such protections in periods of high tension); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (arguing First
Amendment should be limited to political speech).
3 See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915) (comparing
film to circus).
" The Court expressly recognized the emotive value of speech in the much later case of
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no
regard for [the] emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.").
40 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
41 CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
42 CITIZEN KANE (RKO 1941).
43 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
2005]
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It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a
significant medium for the communication of ideas.
They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed
to entertain as well as to inform."
The Joseph Burstyn Court's expanded notion of the predicate for
constitutional protection is hard to mistake. Although the Court
began its analysis with a bow to the purely cognitive-noting that
the First Amendment protects "direct espousal of ... political or
social doctrine"-it went on to indicate that the Constitution also
protects "the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all
artistic expression."45  This was a major leap. Not all art is
demonstrably political, and that which is political is often only
obliquely or remotely so. Nevertheless, the Court suggested that the
First Amendment embraced the whole of film as a medium.46
Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501 (footnote omitted). The Court's decision in Joseph
Burstyn may have been prefigured to some extent by its earlier decision in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). The issue in Winters was whether the state could criminalize
magazines devoted principally to "criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds,
or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime," notwithstanding the First
Amendment. Id. at 508. Although the Court saw "nothing of any possible value to society in
[the] magazines," id. at 510, it nevertheless invalidated Winters' conviction, reasoning that
the line between entertainment and information is so elusive as practically not to exist:
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional
protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the
protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of
propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine.
Id.
45 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
' See id. at 502 ("[E]xpression by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."). The Joseph
Burstyn Court recognized some continuing power in the government to regulate the
exhibition of films, but did not indicate any ground for distinguishing among genres within
the medium. See id. at 502-03 (noting that Constitution does not require "absolute freedom
to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places"). Justice Reed
concurred on the ground that the particular film at issue in the case-The Miracle, which had
VIDEO GAMES
B. PROGRESS, ALBEIT INCOMPLETE
The evolution of doctrine from Mutual Film to Joseph Burstyn
arguably reflected a significant development in the intellectual and
cultural history of the United States. Whereas the Mutual Film
Court expressed concern for the exposition of opinion only insofar as
it found manifestation in highly cognitive forms, the Joseph Burstyn
Court saw comparable value in less cognitive forms of expression,
principally art and drama, that can have an indirect yet powerful
effect on political and social values. In fact, the Mutual Film Court
essentially conceded the potential emotive impact of motion
pictures, but assigned it a negative valence.47 The Joseph Burstyn
Court simply altered the valence and consequently promoted the
medium to constitutionally protected status.48
Notwithstanding the significant liberalizing trend reflected in
Joseph Burstyn, the question still arises whether the Court was not
in some respects continuing to adhere to a relatively conservative
doctrinal approach. Although the Court's rationale was subtle, it
nevertheless justified its decision in terms of the ultimate political
or social impact of motion pictures.49 Thus, perhaps the Joseph
Burstyn Court was simply throwing in the towel on any attempt to
distinguish between subtle and overt messages" rather than
announcing any intention to protect art for art's sake.
On the other hand, the Court may have been signaling precisely
such an intention. According to this view, the grounding of the
Court's analysis in the protection of messages, subtle or direct, may
been claimed to be sacrilegious-was "of a character" protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 506-07 (Reed, J., concurring).
47 See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (noting that
motion pictures are "capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their
attractiveness and manner of exhibition"); see also Ronald W. Adelman, The FirstrAmendment
and the Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1125, 1145 (1996) (noting that "[o]ne of the
most offensive applications of governmental authority under Mutual Film was censorship
designed to preserve the racial status quo").
48 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
" See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501 (noting variety of ways film affects public attitudes
and behavior).
'0 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: 1888-1986, at 514
(1990) ("Even artistic expression has been protected not so much for its own sake as because
of the difficulty of determining when it was a vehicle for commentary on public issues.").
2005]
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have been nothing more than a fig leaf. One can reasonably assume
that the Joseph Burstyn Court intended the natural consequences
of its decision, and although the "subtle reshaping of thought" has
a communicative impact, it may have other impacts as well. There
are thus two distinct ways to read Joseph Burstyn, with significant
ramifications for media that do not seek to affect political discourse
in a discernible way.
By the late twentieth century, the Court appeared to resolve this
uncertainty largely in favor of protecting even pure art.51 In the
short term, however, the Joseph Burstyn Court seemed to
perpetuate this ambiguity, as demonstrated in subsequent decisions
regarding symbolic conduct.
C. SYMBOLIC CONDUCT
Subsequent to Joseph Burstyn, some of the cases that most
challenged the Court to define the protective contours of the First
Amendment involved so-called "symbolic conduct," in which
individuals seek to convey a message through some form of action.
Such conduct provokes many of the same issues as pure art because
it seeks to convey a message without text. As I hope to
demonstrate, however, the Court's work in this area failed to resolve
the question of whether the First Amendment protects pure art.
Instead, the Court avoided the issue by working out a sophisticated
understanding of what constituted a "message."
One of the Court's most comprehensive treatments of the
constitutional status of symbolic conduct was its opinion in Spence
v. Washington.52 In this case, a student had displayed outside his
window an upside-down United States flag with peace symbols
superimposed on either side with removable black tape.53 Given
more recent decisions upholding the burning of flags as a form of
expression,54 we may be astonished to think that the First Amend-
" For a discussion of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), see infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
52 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
53 Id. at 406.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (invalidating Flag
Protection Act of 1989 as applied to flag burners protesting government policy); Texas v.
[Vol. 40:153
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ment would not protect such defacement, but the Spence Court took
pains to decide whether the Constitution can protect a "message"
that lacks words.5 5 At trial, Spence testified that he had displayed
the flag in protest of the recent invasion of Cambodia and shootings
at Kent State University. He was sentenced to ten days in jail,
suspended, and fined $75; on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Washington upheld his conviction.57 Reversing, the Court concluded
that Spence's display satisfied a two-part test for protected
communication-he had an "intent to convey a particularized
message," and "in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it., 58
Spence, and other cases in the same vein, 9 seemed to establish
that for expression to qualify for First Amendment protection, it
must convey a message that: (1) can be articulated in words; and (2)
can be understood by those who perceive it.0 ° Although this
formulation was helpful for Spence and others who engaged in
symbolic conduct, it did little to resolve the ambiguity underlying
Joseph Burstyn. The Spence formulation may encompass most
speech and symbolic conduct, as well as much art, but it certainly
does not include everything that one might regard as "expressive."
Indeed, this test arguably excludes many films, such as Fantasia,
6 1
that lack significant dialogue. It also invites litigation over much
avant-garde film, not to mention much classical music. As a
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (invalidating state statute prohibiting desecration of
venerated objects as applied to flag burner making political statement).
" See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (questioning whether student's act was "sufficiently
imbued with the elements of communication").
56 Id. at 408.
57 Id.
Id. at 410-11.
" See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding
First Amendment protected students' right to wear black armbands in protest of war in
Vietnam); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (holding government could
punish O'Brien for intentionally burning draft card because of legitimate governmental
interest in preserving card as record of holder's status as potential draftee).
' Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
61 FANTASIA (Disney 1940).
62 See David B. Goroff, Note, The First Amendment Side Effects of Curing Pac-Man Fever,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 744, 757-58 (1984) ("While communication often is ideational, it need not
always be. Music is often played solely to create a mood. Much modern art simply tries to
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consequence, one might say that Spence not only failed to resolve
the ambiguity of Joseph Burstyn, but also appeared to undermine
some of Joseph Burstyn's holding.63
Given the apparent inconsistency between Spence and Joseph
Burstyn, one wonders whether the Spence Court intended its test to
apply only to symbolic conduct and not to what might be described
as "pure expressive media." This distinction is enticing, but it begs
the question of what "pure expressive media" are and how they are
defined. It also encourages protracted litigation over any new
medium that lacks a discernible message.64 Suffice it to say that,
under the doctrinal constraints of Spence, one could not know for
certain whether the Court intended to draw abstract art within the
protective ambit of the First Amendment.
D. THE ROAD TO HURLEY
In time, of course, the Court did draw abstract art within the
scope of constitutional protection, eliminating the "discernible
message" requirement without even a backward glance at the
doctrinal limitations seemingly imposed by Spence.6" Indeed, by the
last two decades of the twentieth century, the First Amendment had
grown exponentially in its scope, with courts extending
constitutional protection to a wide variety of media-many of which
combine attractive colors and patterns without standing for any proposition." (citation
omitted)).
' For a relatively recent attempt to reconstruct the First Amendment along the lines of
Spence, see Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 304 (1992) (arguing
that courts should interpret First Amendment to protect only "political speech" and defining
political speech as speech that is "both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue" (emphasis omitted)).
6 See infra notes 74-89 for a discussion of the early cases excluding video games from the
protective ambit of the First Amendment.
' The doctrinal conservatism of Spence may be attributable to the Court's need to
differentiate physical activity that lacks an expressive component, and is therefore fully
subject to regulation, from similar activity that includes such a component. Ironically, Spence
was not the best vehicle for drawing such a distinction. Displaying a flag (except perhaps on
a battlefield) has no discernible mechanical purpose; it is purely a means of expression, such
that modifying a flag is simply modifying a message. A better vehicle for the distinction was
presented in United States v. O'Brien, in which O'Brien was prosecuted for burning a draft
card. 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968). Unlike flag burning, there are mechanical reasons why a
person would ignite a piece of paper, such as wanting to start a fire.
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tend more toward the inchoate than the choate, the artistic than the
political.66
The Supreme Court succinctly captured these trends in Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
which involved the expressive rights of the organizers of a parade.67
In this case, certain gays and lesbians of Irish descent ("GLIB")
sought to march as a group in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade.68
The organizers of the parade objected, and GLIB brought suit under
a statute of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that forbade
sexual orientation discrimination by places of "public
accommodation," which the courts of the state interpreted to include
the parade.69  Reversing the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the Court held that the First Amendment protected
the organizers' right to exclude GLIB from the parade." In reaching
this conclusion, the Supreme Court wrestled with one of GLIB's
principal arguments: because the organizers exercised little control
over the content of the parade, the eclectic and kaleidoscopic parade
had no particular expressive purpose.7 This did not deter the Court
from recognizing the parade's protected status: "[A] narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
particularized message, would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg,
or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." 2
In concluding that the First Amendment applies even in the
absence of a particularized or coherent message, the Hurley Court
emphasized that protected expression can be purely artistic (or
66 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (music); Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,65-66(1981) (dance); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 557-58 (1975) (theater); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (film);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1948) ("lurid" magazines); Argello v. City of
Lincoln, 143 F.3d 1152, 1152-53 (8th Cir. 1998) (fortune telling); Eclipse Enters. v. Gulotta,
134 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1997) (trading cards depicting "heinous crimes"); Bery v. City of
New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996) (visual art).
67 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
68 Id. at 561.
69 Id. at 561-62.
70 Id. at 572-73.
71 See id. at 562 (recounting state court's basis for denying protection).
72 Id. at 569 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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almost purely so) and perhaps also incomprehensible (or quite
nearly so). This finding has enormous and unmistakable value for
the development of non-cognitive forms of expression, both as a
means of affecting audiences and as a means of promoting self-
development. Unfortunately, it also presents (or resurrects) the
quandary of how to discern the protective scope of the First
Amendment. Indeed, given the abstract principle set forth in
Hurley, the question, "What does the First Amendment protect,
other than the traditional press?" becomes roughly synonymous with
the profoundly challenging question, 'What is art?"7 3  Perhaps
anticipating the abyss presented by the principle set forth in Hurley,
lower courts first hearing claims that the First Amendment protects
video games retreated to the conventional question of whether such
games conveyed a discernible message. Finding none, they ruled
accordingly.
III. COURTS AND VIDEO GAMES
A. DECISIONS DENYING PROTECTION
Notwithstanding the copious sentiments expressed in Hurley,
judges may be instinctively inclined to underestimate the expressive
potential of new media, particularly where they cannot readily
distinguish a new medium from mere "spectacle" of the carnival
variety.74 Thus, in a series of cases arising in the early 1980s, a
number of judges held that video games were not a form of
expression falling within the protective ambit of the First
Amendment because they failed to convey a discernible message,
political or otherwise.75 Thus, municipalities could regulate access
78 See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247,
252-60 (1998) (describing three major approaches to defining "art"-"formalism,"
"intentionalism," and "institutionalism").
"' See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915) (refusing
to classify "motion pictures and other spectacles" with "free press and liberty of opinion").
" See Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass 1983)
(agreeing with court's analysis in Showplace that video games are not protected); America's
Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that video game is pure entertainment with no informational element); Kaye v.
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 472 A.2d 809, 810-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding video
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to video games in the same manner in which they regulated access
to bowling alleys76 and pinball machines.77 Perhaps the most
evocative of these cases was Caswell v. Licensing Commission for
Brockton, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
noted that:
[A]ny communication or expression of ideas that occurs
during the playing of a video game is purely
inconsequential. Caswell has succeeded in establishing
only that video games are more technologically advanced
games than pinball or chess. That technological
advancement alone, however, does not impart First
Amendment status to what is an otherwise unprotected
game.78
Although the Caswell court did not cite Spence, its analysis reflected
the approach of that opinion. By looking for a discernible message
or an expressed idea in a video game, the court came upon a ground
for excluding video games from the First Amendment's protective
scope.
Today, video games bear a close resemblance to motion pictures,79
and many people would probably be surprised if the First
Amendment did not protect them as a form of expression. But to
give courts like the Caswell court their due, video games in the early
1980s were somewhat limited in their technological capabilities.
Although they may have represented a significant technological
development beyond pinball, they were still quite short of the works
we are familiar with today."0 In the early and wildly popular video
games lack element of information or some communicated idea); Marshfield Family
Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Mass. 1983) (holding that
video games do not contain sufficient communicative elements to be entitled to protection);
Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Mass. 1983) (stating that
any communication that occurs when playing video game is "purely inconsequential").
16 Marshfield, 450 N.E. at 612.
17 Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174.
78 Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 927.
71 See William Li, Note, Unbaking the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implications
of Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 467, 476-77
(2003) (discussing technological development of video games).
80 See KUSHNER, supra note 6, at 45-46 (noting that "scrolling" was most salient
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game "Pac-Man," for example, the hero simply moved around an
electronic maze, ate dots and packets of energy, and ran away from
bad guys."l If a judge had the choice of analogizing such a game to
Casablanca or to pinball, we should not be surprised that he or she
made the latter analogy. Indeed, in his later-reversed opinion
upholding an ordinance restricting minors' access to video games,
Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri rejected the video game-motion
picture analogy and attempted to reconcile Spence and Joseph
Burstyn as follows:
It appears to the Court if an entirely new "medium" is
being given First Amendment protection, there does
need to be at least some type of communication of ideas
in that medium. It has to be designed to express or
inform, and there has to be a likelihood that others will
understand that there has been some type of
expression. 2
In truth, what most distinguished video games from pinball in
the early 1980s was not so much their current content as their
potential.83 Because pinball is essentially mechanical, it is limited
by real spatial constraints. A game of pinball literally takes place
in the roughly five cubic feet encompassed by the machine's glass,
with a real ball rolling down real ramps and bouncing off real
bumpers and flippers. A video game, by contrast, is essentially
representational, like a book, and therefore can be whatever
technology can make it. Thus, a screen the size of a computer
technological achievement of video games in 1980s); Kiernan, supra note 5, at 218 (noting
greater sophistication of video games).
" See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Pac-Man, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pac-Man
(last visited Aug. 21, 2005) (describing Pac-Man game).
"2 Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1132-33 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
' Cf. Goroff, supra note 62, at 760-61 (arguing that, in deciding whether Constitution
protects new medium, courts should look to medium's expressive potential). As David Goroff
notes, "[t]hat a medium is not currently being used to its fullest potential should not, by itself,
place it outside the purview of the first amendment." Id. at 760.
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monitor with sufficient technological enhancement can recreate
many of the incidents of the invasion of Normandy in 1944.84
Indeed, some jurists noted the expressive potential of video
games as early as the 1980s. In Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc.
v. Town of Marshfield, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts "recognize[d] that in the future video games which
contain sufficient communicative and expressive elements may be
created." 5 Despite this acknowledgment, the court would not allow
this recognition to affect its disposition of the matter at hand, noting
that it was "not prepared.., to hold that these video games, which
are, in essence, only technologically advanced pinball machines, are
entitled to constitutional protection." 6  Several years later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit approached
this same general issue with great trepidation in Rothner v. City of
Chicago, a case involving a challenge to a municipal ordinance
regulating minors' access to video games. 7 After referring to cases
from the early eighties, the Rothner court noted that, on the basis
of the complaint presented, it could not tell whether the video games
at issue were "simply modern day pinball machines" or "more
sophisticated presentations involving storyline and plot that convey
to the user a significant artistic message protected by the first
amendment."8 8 The court continued:
To hold on this record that all video games-no matter
what their content-are completely devoid of artistic
value would require us to make an assumption entirely
unsupported by the record and perhaps totally at odds
with reality. 9
8 See Dan Morris, Call of Duty II. PC Gamer Makes a United Offensive on Infinity
Ward's Offices and Brings Back the Exclusive on the Most Ambitious Wartime Shooter Yet...,
PC GAMER, Apr. 2005, at 38, 44 ("In the Normandy campaign, at the village of Bocage, you'll
be treated to grim face-to-face fights as you make your way through the hedgerows.").
8" 450 N.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Mass. 1983).
6 Id. at 610.
87 929 F.2d 297, 298 (7th Cir. 1991).
88 Id. at 303.
89 Id.
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Later, this same court was the first to extend constitutional
protection to video games.9"
B. DECISIONS EXTENDING PROTECTION
As noted earlier, the early decisions in which courts denied
constitutional protection to video games all arose from municipal
ordinances restricting access to arcades.9' In six recent decisions
considering the issue, the courts extended such protection; three of
these cases involved similar restrictions on access,92 but the other
three were tort actions brought against video game developers and
distributors, in which the plaintiffs alleged that such games had
been the legal cause of injury to themselves or their decedents.93 In
the following analysis, I will concentrate on three of these six
decisions: the Seventh Circuit's decision in American Amusement
Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick,94 the Sixth Circuit's decision in James
v. Meow Media, Inc.,9 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo. (IDSA).96
To conclude that the First Amendment protected the video games at
issue in these cases, each court had to reach two distinct holdings:
First, the games constituted a form of expression presumptively
' See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)
(enjoining enforcement of ordinance restricting minors' access to "harmful" video games).
91 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
' See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954,956 (8th
Cir. 2003) (ordinance enacted by St. Louis County, Missouri); American Amusement, 244 F.3d
at 573 (ordinance enacted by Indianapolis, Indiana); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng,
325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (statute enacted by State of Washington).
"' See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002) (recounting
allegations that video games, along with other media, desensitized youth and caused shooting
rampage at school in Paducah, Kentucky); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d
167, 169 (D. Conn. 2002) (stating plaintiffs argument that video game design and marketing
led to stabbing); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1269 (D. Colo. 2002)
(noting plaintiffs' allegations that video games led to school shooting in Littleton, Colorado,
by making violence pleasurable and attractive and detaching violence from its natural
consequences).
94 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
9' 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
9 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
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entitled to constitutional protection.9 7 Second, they did not fall into
any category of unprotected speech.9"
With regard to the first holding, the courts' decisions were based
on two basic rationales: (1) the video games at issue must
communicate a message, because the basis for regulation or
imposition of liability proceeds from such an assumption; and (2)
video games are expressive because they bear many of the
characteristics of previously recognized forms of expression.99 The
Sixth Circuit's decision in James provides a good example of the
first argument in action;... the Eighth Circuit's decision in IDSA
illustrates the second.'
With respect to the latter holding, all three courts refused to
categorize the video games before them as obscene. 102 In addition,
the James and IDSA courts refused to uphold the actions in
question as constitutionally permitted means of protecting
children.'0 3 Finally, the James court concluded that the games (and
other works) before it did not constitute incitement. 10 4
1. American Amusement. This case involved a City of
Indianapolis ordinance that sought to prevent minors without an
accompanying adult from accessing "amusement machine[s]" that
the city deemed harmful to them.' 5 Under the ordinance, an
97 IDSA, 329 F.3d at 957-58; James, 300 F.3d at 695-96; American Amusement, 244 F.3d
at 574.
98 IDSA, 329 F.3d at 958; James, 300 F.3d at 697-98; American Amusement, 244 F.3d at
574-79.
9 IDSA, 329 F.3d at 957-58; James, 300 F.3d at 695-98; American Amusement, 244 F.3d
at 574-79.
"o See James, 300 F.3d at 696 (noting court does not rule on protected status of video
games broadly but only "as a recognition of the manner in which James seeks to regulate
them through tort liability").
101 See IDSA, 329 F.3d at 957-58 (comparing video games to literature). The Seventh
Circuit did not have to devote much time to this issue because the court below had already
concluded that video games are a form of expression. American Amusement, 244 F.3d at 574.
Judge Posner did go on, however, to note that "[m]ost of the video games in the record of this
case, games that the City believes violate its ordinances, are stories." Id. at 577.
102 IDSA, 329 F.3d at 958; James, 300 F.3d at 697-98; American Amusement, 244 F.3d at
575.
103 See IDSA, 329 F.3d at 958-59 (refusing to uphold ordinance in part because of lack of
evidence linking violent behavior to games); James, 300 F.3d at 696-97 (noting difficulty in
deciding whether protective measures advocated by plaintiffs would be narrowly tailored).
104 James, 300 F.3d at 698-99.
105 American Amusement, 244 F.3d at 573.
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amusement machine "harmful to minors" was one that: (1)
"predominantly appeal[ed] to minors' morbid interest in violence or
minors' prurient interest in sex"; (2) was "patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for persons under the age of
eighteen"; (3) lacked "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value as a whole" for persons under the age of eighteen; and (4)
contained either "graphic violence" or "strong sexual content."1 °6
The ordinance went on to describe "graphic violence" as a "visual
depiction or representation of realistic serious injury to a human or
human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation,
decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or
disfiguration [disfigurement] .,"o7 In support of its ordinance, the
city argued that video games encourage violence by those who play
them, at least where minors are involved.
10 8
Certain manufacturers of video games and one of their trade
associations brought suit in federal court to enjoin enforcement of
the ordinance, arguing that it constituted an impermissible
restraint on speech.0 9 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana denied plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction, and the case proceeded to the Seventh
Circuit from that denial."0
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit began its
analysis by noting the extent to which the city had attempted to
categorize violent video games as obscene and thereby take
advantage of obscenity's status as an unprotected form of
expression, particularly where minors are involved.' Indeed, the
city's ordinance closely tracked the Supreme Court's three-part test
for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California"2 and the statute
upheld in Ginsberg v. New York,"' which restricted minors' access
106 id.
.07 Id. (alteration in original).
1o" Id. at 573-74.
109 Id. at 573.
110 Id. at 574.
111 Id.
11 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
113 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968).
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to material deemed obscene as to them.'14 Under Miller, the First
Amendment does not protect material if: (1) "'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) "the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law"; and (3) "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value." '115 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a statute
forbidding the sale to minors of any "representation" of "nudity"
that: (1) "predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors"; (2) "is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what
is suitable material for minors"; and (3) "is utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors."16
Although the city had faithfully tracked Miller and the statute
upheld in Ginsberg, it still needed to surmount the preliminary
obstacle of convincing the court that the First Amendment would
allow violence to be categorized with obscenity-at least with
respect to minors." 7 Precedent suggested that the city would not
succeed. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressly confined regulation
of obscenity to "works which depict or describe sexual conduct.""'
Similarly, in 1992 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit struck down a statute of the State of Missouri that sought
to regulate, in a manner of speaking, obscene violence as to
minors." '9 The Eighth Circuit rested its conclusion in large part on
the observation that "[m]aterial that contains violence but not
depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct cannot be obscene.
Thus, videos depicting only violence do not fall within the legal
definition of obscenity for either minors or adults."'2 °
114 Id. at 631-33.
"' Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
15 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633.
117 American Amusement, 244 F.3d at 574.
118 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20
(1971) ("Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States' broader power to prohibit
obscene expression, such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.").
119 See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684,688 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
Missouri statute designed to limit minors' access to violent videos unconstitutional).
120 Id. (citation omitted).
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The courts' refusal to equate violence with obscenity-even with
respect to children-did not seal the fate of Indianapolis's ordinance,
but it certainly did not help. Indeed, notwithstanding Miller, the
American Amusement court was willing to countenance the
argument that some depictions of violence could be obscene in the
sense of being offensive or of turning the stomach, but it failed to
find any such depictions in the video games under consideration.121
Turning to the question of whether Indianapolis could justify its
ordinance in terms of the instrumental impact of video games-that
is, their effect on children's behavior-the court expressed profound
skepticism on several grounds. First, the court was highly solicitous
of children's right to learn and receive information.'22 The crux of
the court's argument was that children bear heavy responsibilities
as soon as they become adults. 2 ' In order to discharge these
responsibilities, the court reasoned, they need exposure to the
realities of life. As the court noted, "[p] eople are unlikely to become
well-functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible
citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble."'24
Second, the court expressed a fairly strong conviction that the
city's argument proved too much: if the government could regulate
children's access to violent imagery, it could preclude
unaccompanied reading of The Odyssey, The Divine Comedy, War
and Peace, the short stories of Edgar Allen Poe, Frankenstein, and
Dracula.'25
Third, the court was openly skeptical of arguments regarding the
allegedly harmful effects of video games predicated upon
psychological research, challenging the asserted causal connection
121 American Amusement, 244 F.3d at 575.
122 See id. at 576-77 (explaining importance of children's First Amendment rights). The
court noted that
[c]hildren have First Amendment rights. This is not merely a matter of
pressing the First Amendment to a dryly logical extreme. The murderous
fanaticism displayed by young German soldiers in World War II, alumni
of the Hitler Jugend, illustrates the danger of allowing government to
control the access of children to information and opinion.
Id. (citations omitted).
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between video games and violent behavior. 2 6  According to the
court, the studies simply demonstrated a correlation between video
games and aggressive feelings.'27 The court then went on to note
that the studies revealed nothing unique about video games even in
relation to the provocation of aggressive feelings; therefore, the
studies were no more conclusive as to the effects of video games
than to the effects of violent imagery in general.
121
Given this skepticism, the court had little difficulty deciding that
the First Amendment protected at least the bulk of the video games
at issue.'29 Accordingly, it remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction.'
2. James. In James v. Meow Media, Inc., the plaintiffs brought
a tort action against a multitude of media defendants after the
December 1997 school shooting in Paducah, Kentucky. 3 ' The
plaintiffs argued that various video games and the film Basketball
Diaries had caused Michael Carneal, then a junior high school
126 See id. at 579 ('The studies thus are not evidence that that violent video games are any
more harmful.., than violent movies .. !).
127 See id. at 578-79 ('The studies do not find that video games have ever caused anyone
to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the average level of
violence to increase anywhere.").
128 See id. at 579 ('The studies thus are not evidence that violent video games are any
more harmful to the consumer or to the public safety than violent movies or other violent, but
passive, entertainments.").
129 See id. at 577 ("Most of the video games in the record of this case, games the City
believes violate its ordinances, are stories."). As the court noted,
[i]t is conceivable though unlikely that in a plenary trial the City can
establish the legality of the ordinance .... We have emphasized the
"literary" character of the games in the record and the unrealistic
appearance of their "graphic" violence. If the games used actors and
simulated real death and mutilation convincingly, or if the games lacked
any story line and were merely animated shooting galleries (as several of
the games in the record appear to be), a more narrowly drawn ordinance
might survive a constitutional challenge.
Id. at 579-80. Given Judge Posner's analysis earlier in the case, see id. at 575, his reference
to the "use[ ] [of] actors and [the] simulat[ion] [of] real death and mutilation convincingly,"
id. at 579, is most likely a reference to the possibility, in the court's view, that some violent
imagery might qualify as obscenity.
130 Id. at 580. Judge Posner also reasoned that the interactivity of video games does not
cut against their status as expression. In fact, he opined that interactivity enhances the
expressive impact of a medium. See id. at 577 ("All literature (here broadly defined to include
movies, television, and the other photographic media, and popular as well as highbrow
literature) is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive.").
131 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002).
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student, to murder three of his classmates. 132 With respect to the
games, the plaintiffs theorized that the games encouraged Carneal
to act violently without subjecting him to normative constraints. 133
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, relying on
conventional tort defenses as well as a First Amendment defense. 3 1
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky granted the motion solely on the basis of non-
constitutional considerations, primarily Kentucky's tort law, 135 with
little more than an oblique reference to the First Amendment. 136
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, per Judge Boggs, without reaching the constitutional
issues, at least as a formal matter. 131 Instead, the court resolved the
case principally on the ground that the defendants had no legal duty
to foresee Carneal's violent behavior, describing any reaction he had
to the games and movies at issue as "idiosyncratic."'138 The court
bolstered this conclusion by reasoning that the defendants had no
duty to prevent a third party from committing a crime where they
had no special relationship with him139 and had not vested him with
ultra-hazardous materials in a manner conventional doctrine would
recognize as tortious. 4 ° With regard to this last point, the court
132 Id. at 687-88.
13 Id. at 688. The plaintiffs in James alleged, among other things, that "[t]he Video Game
Defendants manufactured and/or supplied to Michael Carneal violent video games which
made the violence pleasurable and attractive, and disconnected the violence from the natural
consequences thereof, thereby causing Michael Carneal to act out the violence." Complaint
20 at 16-17, James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (No. CIV.A.
5:99CV-96-J).
1 See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798,802-03 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (discussing
and ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss).
1'5 See id. at 803-04. The district court continued:
[The Court concludes as a matter of law that it was clearly unreasonable
to expect Defendants to have foreseen Plaintiffs' injuries from Michael
Carneal's actions. Because the injuries were unforeseeable, Defendants
did not owe a duty of care upon which liability can be imposed.
Id. at 803.
136 See id. at 818 ("[Slince Kentucky law adequately resolves the issues presented in this
matter, the Court will not address the constitutional issues looming in the background.").
137 See James, 300 F.3d at 695 ("We agree with the district court that attaching tort
liability to the effect that . . . ideas have on a criminal actor would raise significant
constitutional problems under the First Amendment that ought to be avoided.").
138 Id. at 693.
'39 Id. at 694.
140 Id. at 694-95.
178
2005] VIDEO GAMES 179
emphasized the difference between the types of "implements" that
ordinarily qualify as "ultra-hazardous" materials and the "ideas and
images" at issue in the case, noting that "[b]eyond their
intangibility, such ideas and images are at least one step removed
from the implements that can be used in the criminal act itself."''
Although the court did not formally reach the constitutional
issues implicated in the case, it strongly implied that it was
rendering its decision in the shadow of the First Amendment.'42 The
court began its constitutional analysis by addressing the issue of
whether video games constitute a form of expression presumptively
entitled to the protection of the Constitution, resolving the question
in a surprisingly straightforward way by taking its cue from the
manner in which the plaintiffs had asserted their claim. 4 ' As the
court noted, the essence of the plaintiffs' argument was that the
games had somehow communicated a message to Carneal to engage
in violent behavior without the benefit of moral training.' Given
this argument, the games had to qualify as protected expression;
otherwise, the plaintiffs' case-in-chief would have made no sense. 145
In reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit echoed the Seventh
Circuit's speculation that, in some instances, the First Amendment
141 Id. at 695. The James court went on to hold that, even if the defendants had a duty
to prevent harm to the plaintiffs, that duty was most likely cut off by Carneal's superseding
criminal act. Id. at 700. The court also held that the defendants' various creations were not
"products," at least not in the context of the plaintiffs' theory, for purposes of imposing any
form of product liability. Id. at 700-01.
142 See id. at 699 ("Attaching ... tort liability to the ideas and images conveyed by the
video games ... raises grave constitutional concerns that provide yet an additional policy
reason not to impose a duty of care between the defendants and the victims in this case.").
The court devoted four pages of the opinion to the First Amendment issues it did not formally
decide. See id. at 695-99 (discussing "First Amendment Problems").
143 See id. at 695 (noting plaintiffs did not seek to place liability on defendants for
manufacturing cartridges but because of ideas and images communicated).
144 See id. at 695 ("Although the defendants' products may be a mixture of expressive and
inert content, the plaintiffs' theory of liability isolates the expressive content of the
defendants' products.").
145 See id. at 696 ("Because the plaintiffs seek to attach tort liability to the communicative
aspect of the video games produced by the defendants, we have little difficulty in holding that
the First Amendment protects video games in the sense uniquely relevant to this lawsuit.");
see also Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002) ('Taking [the
plaintiffs] allegations as true, the Court concludes that [the interactive video game] Mortal
Kombat, as [the plaintiff] describes it, is protected First Amendment speech.').
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might not protect video games. 146 For example, the court noted the
physical aspects of these games, intimating that such non-
expressive features could be outside the protective ambit of the
Constitution: "Extending First Amendment protection to video
games certainly presents some thorny issues. After all, there are
features of video games which are not terribly communicative, such
as the manner in which the player controls the game.' 14' Because
the plaintiffs had predicated their argument on the supposed
messages of the games, however, the court concluded that any
physical aspects of the games were irrelevant. 4 '
The James court then addressed a series of constitutional issues
that are not unique to video games: (1) whether the government
could constitutionally impose liability on the defendants simply as
a means of protecting children; (2) whether the various works at
issue constituted obscenity; and (3) whether the works constituted
incitement. 14
With respect to the first issue, the court noted that laws designed
to regulate speech simply for the benefit of children are nevertheless
subject to strict scrutiny. 5 ° Concluding that imposing liability for
negligence in the case before them would fail such scrutiny, the
court emphasized the amorphous nature of the duty that the
plaintiffs sought to attach to the defendants:
At trial, the plaintiff would undoubtedly argue about the
efficient measures that the defendants should have
taken to protect the children. But at the end of this
process, it would be impossible for reviewing courts to
evaluate whether the proposed protective measures
would be narrowly tailored regulations. Who would
know what omission the jury relied upon to find the
146 See James, 300 F.3d at 696 (noting "thorny issues" with extension of First Amendment
protection to video games); Am. Amusements Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th
Cir. 2001) (supposing violent depictions could rise to obscenity).
147 James, 300 F.3d at 696.
148 Id. at 696; see infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of this general
point.
149 See James, 300 F.3d at 696.99 (discussing constitutional issues surrounding regulation
of movies, websites, and video games).
'50 Id. at 696.
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defendants negligent? Moreover, under the concept of
negligence, there is no room for evaluating the value of
the speech itself.'51
In essence, the court reasoned that the process by which a jury
reaches a verdict is insufficiently controlled and insufficiently
sensitive to the value of the expression at issue to pass
constitutional muster.
152
The James court then rejected the proposition that the
defendants' works were legally obscene and therefore outside First
Amendment protection. 153 In doing so, the court divided these works
into two groups-those containing explicit sexual content and those
containing no such content.154 With respect to the first category, the
court refused to raise the constitutional bar because the plaintiffs
had not asserted any kind of sexual assault.15 5 The court implicitly
reasoned that there must be a logical connection between the ground
for excluding expression from constitutional protection and the
ground for imposing liability for that same expression.156 With
respect to the category of works lacking sexual content, the court
followed the Seventh Circuit in American Amusement in noting that
obscenity falls outside the protective ambit of the First Amendment
because of its offensiveness, not because of any potential harm.' 57
Because the plaintiffs' case proceeded on the theory that the
defendants' works had caused Carneal's criminal acts, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs' own argument was inconsistent
with a claim that these works were obscene. 5 '
'51 Id. at 697.
152 See id. at 696-97 (discussing difficulty arising when tort liability is allowed to regulate
access to expression).
153 Id. at 698.
154 See id. at 697-98 (comparing sex-oriented website with games and movies containing
violent imagery).
155 Id.
16 See id. (noting plaintiffs did not seek to hold defendants liable for sexual crime but for
murder).
157 Id. at 698 (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.
2001)). The Sixth Circuit also declined to include "violent, instead of sexually explicit,
material" in its definition of obscenity. Id.
15 See id. (reasoning that concept of obscenity is not designed to protect against behavior
speech is believed to create).
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The court's treatment of the incitement issue was more extensive.
Indeed, this issue played a central role in James because of the
nature of the case. After all, the plaintiffs' basic theory was that the
defendants' expressive works caused Carneal to commit violent
acts. 159 Because the plaintiffs' theory sounded in tort, the most
plausible exception to First Amendment protection was that of
incitement. 160 But precedent, in the form of Brandenburg v. Ohio16
and Hess v. Indiana,162 lay somewhat squarely in their way. Thus,
the issue in James was whether the Sixth Circuit would somehow
distinguish those cases.'63 Given the almost universal success of
"media defendants" in similar cases, 64 the plaintiffs faced a
decidedly uphill battle and, in fact, did not succeed.
In Brandenburg, the State of Ohio obtained a conviction against
Brandenburg for incendiary remarks he made at a Ku Klux Klan
159 Id.
16" See id. (noting that protecting public from violence speech might incite is not
"completely impermissible purpose for regulating speech").
161 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
162 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
163 See James, 300 F.3d at 698 (discussing Brandenburg and Hess).
Prior to James, courts had rejected numerous lawsuits in which plaintiffs argued that
various media had been the legal cause of compensable injury. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms); Herceg
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (article about "autoerotic
asphyxiation"); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *12 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 1997) (song "2Pacalypse Now"); Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (M.D.
Ga. 1991) (song "Suicide Solution"); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199, 206 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (TV violence in general); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rpt. 187, 193-94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (song "Suicide Solution"); Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 630-31 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (film Boulevard Nights); Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892-93 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (film Born Innocent); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (film The Warriors); DeFilippo v. NBC, Inc., 446A.2d 1036, 1039 (R.I.
1982) (episode of The Tonight Show). These decisions generally held that the defendants'
work did not constitute incitement under Brandenburg and Hess.
Courts have allowed liability in situations that tend to be readily distinguishable from
the cases noted in the previous paragraph. In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., for example,
the publisher of an assassination manual stipulated that it intended the book to be used by
would-be killers and had knowledge that it would be used in this way. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.
1997). Given this, one can reasonably infer that the manual at issue in Rice either
constituted incitement within the meaning of Brandenburg and Hess, see Rice, 128 F.3d at
263 (finding book Hit Man "directly and unmistakingly urges concrete violation of the laws
against murder" and provides instructions to that end), or satisfied a close analytical
substitute for Brandenburg, such as a requirement that the publisher aid and abet a crime
182
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rally, portions of which were recorded on film and broadcast. 165
Notwithstanding the inflammatory nature of Brandenburg's
language-including his oblique references to acts of violence, the
presence of firearms at the rally, and the presence of the electronic
media-the Court reversed the conviction and held that Ohio could
not punish him for his speech.166 In doing so, the Court set forth a
highly protective test for abstract advocacy of lawless behavior,
stating that the Constitution protects such advocacy unless it is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. 167
Hess v. Indiana involved an individual convicted of violating
Indiana's disorderly conduct statute.16 After police had cleared a
street during a protest, Hess said, in a loud voice and in the
presence of others, "We'll take the [f--king] street later."'69 Although
both by having a subjective intent to assist in its commission, and by in fact substantially
assisting in its commission. See id. at 251-55 (holding plaintiff created jury issue by showing
that publisher actually intended to aid and abet murder). It is also worth noting that Judge
Luttig, who wrote the opinion in Rice, described the case as "unique," stating that "neither
the extensive briefing by the parties and the numerous amici in this case, nor the exhaustive
research which the court itself has undertaken, has revealed even a single case that we
regard as factually analogous to this case." Id. at 265.
In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., the Supreme Court of California affirmed a judgment
against a radio station that had exhorted its listeners to drive around town in search of a
peripatetic disc jockey. 539 P.2d 36, 39-42 (Cal. 1975). Two listeners racing to find the jockey
had driven another person off the road. Id. at 39. Although the radio station had not literally
"directed" or "intended" its listeners to drive people off the road, it had "directed" or
"intended" them to find a moving target in a busy city. See id. at 41 (predicating liability on
defendant's creation of unreasonable risk of harm). The tortious act was thus fully integrated
with the act that the station directed. Moreover, in affirming the verdict against the station,
the court barely gave any consideration at all to the First Amendment issue presented, see
id. at 40 ('The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word[ ] rather than act."), and at least one court has been content to treat
this case as involving purely commercial speech. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814
F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the
Power of Suggestion: Protecting "Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harm, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 984, 999-1000 (1994) (arguing courts do not apply Brandenburg in context of
commercial speech). As Brill noted: "The Weirum court did not explicitly reject the First
Amendment defense based on the commercial speech rationale, but no other rationale can
explain the slight attention devoted to the free speech issue in the case." Id. at 999 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
'6 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (per curiam).
'6 Id. at 445, 448-49.
167 Id. at 447.
18 414 U.S. 105, 105 (1973) (per curiam).
16 Id. at 107.
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he had been physically proximate to his putative audience, the
situation had been volatile, and his words at least sounded like an
exhortation to lawlessness, the Court nevertheless reversed Hess's
conviction, noting that his remarks had not been "directed to any
person or group in particular."'7 ° In addition, reiterating and
perhaps even strengthening the high degree of scienter required by
Brandenburg, the Hess Court added that the Constitution protected
Hess's remarks unless he had "intended to produce ... imminent
disorder."17'
Applying this precedent, the Sixth Circuit understandably
refused to classify the works before it as incitement. First, the court
noted that the James defendants had not "intend[ed] to produce
violent actions" by the people who watched or played their works;
they thus failed to demonstrate the high degree of scienter required
by Brandenburg and Hess.'72 Second, the court reasoned that the
plaintiffs' own theory of liability foreclosed the possibility that
Carneal's reaction to the works in question, if any, was "imminent":
Even the theory of causation in this case is that
persistent exposure to the defendants' media gradually
undermined Carneal's moral discomfort with violence to
the point that he solved his social disputes with a gun.
This glacial process of personality development is far
from the temporal imminence that we have required to
satisfy the Brandenburg test.
173
Third, the court refused to describe Carneal's possible reaction to
the works at issue as "likely."' 74 This was not surprising given the
court's earlier description of Carneal's behavior as "idiosyncratic.' 75
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish
Brandenburg by arguing that it applies only to political advocacy. 1
76
170 Id. at 107-08.
171 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
172 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 699.
175 Id. at 693.
176 See id. at 699 (noting federal courts apply Brandenburg test to all types of expression).
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3. IDSA. Like American Amusement, IDSA involved an
ordinance that attempted to restrict minors' access to video
games.177 Video game manufacturers and distributors brought suit
to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, arguing that it violated the
First Amendment.17 The United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Missouri denied plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and proceeded sua sponte to dismiss the case, reasoning
that the basis for denying the motion and the basis for dismissing
the case were the same.179 The Eighth Circuit, per Judge Morris
Sheppard Arnold, reversed and remanded with instructions to
enjoin operation of the ordinance.8 °
In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit necessarily
decided that the First Amendment protects video games as a form
of expression.' Its analysis included some of the reasoning
previously espoused by other courts. For example, the Eighth
Circuit adopted Judge Posner's observation that the games subject
to the ordinance were thematically indistinct from fairly tales,
legends, and epics."12 The court also reasoned, much like the Sixth
Circuit in James, that the video games at issue must be expressive
because the ordinance isolated them for regulatory treatment
precisely because of their message.' 3
The IDSA court also analyzed other aspects of video games. In
particular, it recognized the characteristics that such games share
with other forms of art. ' Quoting Hurley, the court observed that
177 Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir.
2003).
178 Id.
171 See id. (noting that trial court dismissed case after ruling on ordinance's
constitutionality).
'80 Id. at 960.
'Si See id. at 957 (comparing video games to painting by Jackson Pollock).
182 Id. (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577-78 (7th Cir.
2001)). The court also joined in Judge Posner's observation that expressiveness and
interactivity are positively correlated. See id. at 957-58 (quoting Judge Posner's reasoning
that successful literature is highly interactive).
183 See id. at 957 ("Indeed, we find it telling that the County seeks to restrict access to
these video games precisely because their content purportedly affects the thought or behavior
of those who play them.").
184 See id. (noting "scripts" and "story boards" showing "storyline," "character
development," and "dialogue" of video games set forth in record).
20051
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if the First Amendment protects abstract painting, avant-garde
music, and nonsensical poetry, it must also protect video games:
If the first amendment is versatile enough to "shield
[the] painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll," we
see no reason why the pictures, graphic design, concept
art, sounds, music, stories, and narrative present in
video games are not entitled to a similar protection.1
8 5
Having concluded that video games constitute a form of protected
expression, the court next addressed whether the county could
nevertheless regulate access to them, either because they fell into
a category of unprotected speech, or because the regulation was
justified under strict scrutiny."8 6
Relying on well-settled circuit precedent, the IDSA court made
short work of the county's suggestion that "graphically violent" video
games are a form of obscenity.8 7 The court noted, "[Wie have
previously observed that 'material that contains violence but not
depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct cannot be obscene.' "18
Next, the court turned to the county's defense of the ordinance as
necessary to serve the compelling public interest of protecting
children." 9 Although the court conceded the importance of this
interest in the abstract, 9 ° it did not find persuasive the county's
various arguments regarding the deleterious effects of video games
on children.' Last, the court addressed the county's argument that
the ordinance simply reinforced parents' rights to control the
upbringing of their children.'92 Although solicitous of this right, the
" Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
18 Id. at 958.
187 Id.




191 See id. at 958-59 ('The County's conclusion that there is a strong likelihood that minors
who play violent video games will suffer a deleterious effect on their psychological health is
simply unsupported in the record.").
192 Id. at 959.
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court nevertheless refused to uphold the ordinance on this ground,
reasoning that children should generally have the same access as
adults to speech protected by the First Amendment. 193
IV. DISCUSSION
Notwithstanding decisions such as American Amusement, James,
and IDSA, several commentators have argued that courts should not
afford full constitutional protection to video games containing
violent imagery, at least where such games are alleged to cause
violent behavior in children. These arguments take a number of
forms. Several, for example, emphasize the alleged deleterious
effects of such games on children and on society in general.'94 One
commentator has even characterized the effect of Brandenburg in
this context as a subsidy to the creators and distributors of video
games. 9 ' Professor Garry has argued that courts should be wary of
extending protection to such novel media as video games because
valuable speech will be stifled in a cacophony of relatively worthless
speech.9 6 In fact, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the
Supreme Court's analysis in Mutual Film, Garry has further argued
that courts should permit extensive regulation of violent imagery in
video games precisely because such imagery is available in
traditional, cognitive media:
Is not the print medium a place where individuals get a
more informed, broad-based, and less sensationalized
education on a subject such as social violence?... [The
193 See id. at 959-60 ("Mhe government cannot silence protected speech by wrapping itself
in the cloak of parental authority.").
194 See SAUNDERS, supra note 7, at 46-48 (arguing that violent video games teach and
condition people to kill); Dee, supra note 7, at 734-37 (arguing that as long as "society
glorif[ies] gratuitous violence, mentally disturbed children will kill other children"); Garry,
supra note 7, at 141-43 (discussing alleged harmful behavioral effect of violent video games);
Kunich, supra note 7, at 1262-64 (arguing that survivors of media related tragedies should
recover for "shock tort"); Kevin E. Barton, Note, Game Over! Legal Responses to Video Game
Violence, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 133, 137-44 (2002) (noting alleged
correlation between video game violence and violent behavior tendencies); Kiernan, supra
note 5, at 244-46 (arguing that games teach and condition kids to kill).
19' Kiernan, supra note 5, at 239.
196 Garry, supra note 7, at 140.
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occurrence and concept of violence is pervasively
expressed through every medium in society. Thus, is it
really an unconstitutional abridgment of an idea or
image to limit its expression or conveyance in just one of
the media outlets operating in a media-abundant
society?197
These commentators, along with others who have written
generally about violence in the media, have proposed a variety of
judicial responses to the problems allegedly presented by video
games. Some, for example, have argued that the courts should
expand the category of obscenity to include violent imagery, at least
where children are concerned. 9 ' Others have advocated a
modification or abandonment of Brandenburg in this context,
arguing that the case is too rigid,'99 that it was never intended to
apply to nonpolitical expression, 00 that the requirement of
"imminence" should be modified or abandoned,0 1 or that the test
should not apply where the speech in question allegedly caused
actual harm.20 2 In the following sub-parts of this Article, I respond
to these arguments. I begin by evaluating the recent cases holding
197 Id. at 151.
193 SAUNDERS, supra note 7, at 149-50; Garry, supra note 7, at 147-48, 149-50; Barton,
supra note 194, at 158.
19 See Crump, supra note 7, at 45 (proposing that courts replace Brandenburg with more
lenient multi-factor test); Kunich, supra note 7, at 1169 (arguing rigorous test of Brandenburg
was probably not intended to be applied literally or in contexts outside facts of that case);
Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting From Media Speech:
A Comprehensive First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231,279-92 (1992) (proposing
multi-factor test to replace Brandenburg); Kiernan, supra note 5, at 236-39 (arguing that
Brandenburg is "overprotective" and applying it to physical injury context "warps it").
20 See Kunich, supra note 7, at 1169-70 (maintaining that, against Supreme Court's
intention, Brandenburg has been applied to factually dissimilar cases); cf. Kiernan, supra
note 5, at 236 ("Brandenburg was not intended to apply to the tort context.").
201 See Kunich, supra note 7, at 1170-71 (arguing that imminence should function as
measure of predictability); cf. Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability
Principles to Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REV. 603, 664
(2000) (defending Brandenburg but arguing that courts should treat imminence as only one
factor in determining causation).
202 See Kunich, supra note 7, at 1222 (pointing out difference between prosecution of mere
possibility of harm and civil remedy of one who is actually injured); Kiernan, supra note 5,
at 237-38 (noting that in video game tort cases actual harm has occurred, whereas in
Brandenburg harm was only threatened).
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that video games are a form of expression presumptively entitled to
constitutional protection.
A. VIDEO GAMES AS EXPRESSION
Courts have properly concluded that the First Amendment
protects video games as a form of expression. These games possess
all the characteristics of an art form. First, like other art, they are
representational. They may look like universes full of gothic
architecture, labyrinthine tunnels, and grotesque characters, but in
fact they are electronic representations of such things, much like
paintings, movies, or TV shows. Second, video games often. have
aesthetic value. The architecture depicted in a video game, for
example, can be magnificent, squalid, or both. Indeed, many schools
now teach the art and science of creating interactive video games." 3
Third, these games often tie music and narration to the player's
movement through the various levels, and these features can be
every bit as evocative as the soundtrack of a film or broadcast." 4
Finally, video games often build upon powerful, elemental
themes, just like fairy tales or epic poems.0 5 As Judge Posner
opined in American Amusement, "[s] elf-defense, protection of others,
dread of the 'undead,' fighting against overwhelming odds-these
are all age-old themes of literature, and ones particularly appealing
to the young."2 6 Indeed, the very aspect of video games most often
decried by their detractors-their reliance, in certain genres, on
violent imagery-is itself a staple of art and literature. Judge
Posner noted as much American Amusement, °7 and he is far from
203 See, e.g., Tamra Fitzpatrick, New School for Video-Game Degree No Child's
Play-Redmond Institute First to Offer Degree in Field, SEATLE TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1998, at B1
(announcing first school with degree in video game technology).
204 See Steven L. Kent, Composers Score Points on Games; Video Game Music Is Known
to Top the Charts Overseas, but Notoriety in the U.S. Is Lacking, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2002,
Business, at 1 ("In Japan, where video games are readily accepted into mainstream culture
as works of art, game music is sold in record stores. The music from Nintendo's 'Pikmin,' for
instance, topped the charts for weeks.").
"o' See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
(comparing video games to art and literature).
206 Id. at 577-78.
207 See id. at 578 ('These games with their cartoon characters and stylized mayhem are
continuous with age-old children's literature on violent themes.").
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alone in his observations. As Professor Torben Grodal of the
University of Copenhagen, Denmark, recently noted:
The themes and actions of most video games are
updated versions of fairy tales and Homer's Odyssey,
enhanced by modern audiovisual salience and
interactive capabilities. Central themes are the fights
with dragons and evil monsters in combination with
quests through dangerous and exotic scenarios. It is
furthermore important for many games that the hero
rescues damsels in distress. That there are only a few
basic narrative patterns in video games is not surprising
because there are not many basic narrative patterns in
fiction." 8
Similarly, Marjorie Heins, Director and Staff Counsel of ACLU Arts
Censorship Project, has observed that:
Historically, violence is an eternal theme in literature,
art, popular entertainment and even games invented by
children at play. From the gory wartime atrocities in
Homer's Iliad and Odyssey to the fantasy action in
Mortal Kombat and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles,
human culture has displayed, reflected and documented
aggression and violence.209
208 Torben Grodal, Video Games and the Pleasures of Control, in MEDIA ENTERTAINMENT:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ITS APPEAL 197, 211 (Dolf Zillmann & Peter Vorderer eds., 2000).
209 Marjorie Heins, Blaming the Media: Would Regulation of Expression Prevent Another
Columbine?, 14 MEDIA STUD. J. 14, 15 (2000). Further support for this point is provided by
Joan E. Bertin, executive director of the National Coalition Against Censorship, who testified
as to the following before the New York State Task Force on Youth Violence and the
Entertainment Industry:
[G]raphic depictions of violence can be found in the Bible, The Odyssey,
Agamemnon, Faulkner's Light in August, and James Dickey's Deliverance;
in films such as Paths of Glory, The Seventh Seal, and The Godfather; in
Picasso's Guernica and almost all religious art depicting the Crucifixion
and religious martyrdom; and in theater including much of Shakespeare
(Macbeth, Henry V, Titus Andronicus).
Joan E. Bertin, The Problem of Media Violence Does Not Justify Censorship, in VIOLENCE IN
THEMEDIA 37,40 (James D. Torr ed., 2001); see also Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and
A Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of Kids' Culture and the First Amendment,
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Indeed, one wonders how a visual artist could depict the following
under a legal regime that denied constitutional protection to violent
imagery:
With that, just as Dolon reached up for his chin
to cling with a frantic hand and beg for life,
Diomedes struck him square across the neck-
a flashing hack of the sword-both tendons snapped
and the shrieking head went tumbling in the dust.21°
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, excluding violent imagery
from the protective ambit of the First Amendment would exclude so
much of what we consider classic art and literature that we would
be left with only remnants of the western canon. Because we
presumably want to avoid any such result, we cannot allow the
violent imagery upon which some video games rely to exclude them
from constitutional protection.
Furthermore, although video games may be distinctive in some
respects, none of their distinguishing characteristics should suffice
to deprive them of protected status. For example, their status as
games should not deprive them of protection. Courts have
recognized that games can be protected expression. In
Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff, for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged that
the First Amendment protects a board game called "Public
Assistance-Why Bother Working For a Living," which makes fun
of welfare programs and provoked severe criticism."' Similarly, in
Watters v. TSR, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky held that "Dungeons & Dragons," a
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2002) (describing history of violent imagery in arts); cf. Micro
Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (copyright case) ("Duke Nukem's
world is made up of aliens, radioactive slime and freezer weapons-clearly fantasies, even by
Los Angeles standards.').
210 HOMER, THE ILIAD, bk. 10,11. 523-27 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1990) (n.d.);
see also 1 Kings 18:40 (King James) ("And Elijah said unto them, Take the prophets of Baal;
let not one of them escape. And they took them: and Elijah brought them down to the brook
Kishon, and slew them there.").
211 707 F.2d 33, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1983).
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medieval fantasy board game, qualifies as a protected form of
expression, whether it qualifies as literature or as merely a game.
212
Moreover, the incidental physical aspects of video games should
not deprive them of their protected status.213 First, some forms of
protected expression, such as dance,214 are purely physical. This
aside, one cannot persuasively argue that the First Amendment only
protects non-physical, or purely ideational, activity. All expression
requires some motor activity. One must move a pen to write; one
must press fingers to a keyboard to type. The First Amendment
must be interpreted to protect physical activities that are so
inextricably bound up with expression that expression would be
impossible without them.215
Similarly, any focus on the interactive nature of such games
would be misplaced. As the Supreme Court has noted, "a private
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices. 21 6  There are some plays, for
example, whose final act depends on the vote of the audience. In
fact, all good art and literature is "interactive," in the sense that it
engages its reader, listener, or viewer. 217 As Judge Posner noted in
American Amusement, the argument that video games merit distinct
treatment because they are interactive
is superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature (here
broadly defined to include movies, television, and the
other photographic media, and popular as well as
highbrow literature) is interactive; the better it is, the
212 715 F. Supp. 819, 821 (W.D. Ky. 1989), affd on other grounds, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1990).
21' But cf. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[here are
features of video games which are not terribly communicative, such as the manner in which
the player controls the game.").
214 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (holding that nude
dancing is protected expression).
215 See Goroff, supra note 62, at 750.51 (noting difficulty of clearly distinguishing between
speech and conduct).
216 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995).
217 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 4 (1984) ('The reconstitution
of culture in a relation shared between speaker and audience is in fact a universal human
activity, engaged in by every speaker in every culture, literate or illiterate.").
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more interactive. Literature when it is successful draws
the reader into the story, makes him identify with the
characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with
them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the
reader's own.218
In fact, the player's role in the unfolding drama of a video game is
arguably only relevant in the sense that the more the player
becomes involved in the plot, the stronger the game's claim to
constitutional protection.219
Finally, attention should be.paid to the emerging amalgamation
of video games, computer-generated imagery, and motion pictures.22 °
Indeed, we have already reached the point, both technologically and
artistically, at which video games and films are literally overlapping
artistic genres. For example, George Lucas's recent work, Star
218 Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
219 See Goroff, supra note 62, at 766-68 (arguing that information presented through video
games may have more impact than information conveyed through other media because of
interactive element); see also Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D.
Conn. 2002) ('The nature of the interactivity set out in [the] complaint.., tends to cut in
favor of First Amendment protection, inasmuch as it is alleged to enhance everything
expressive and artistic about Mortal Kombat: the battles become more realistic, the thrill and
exhilaration of fighting is more pronounced."); Nick Wingfield & Merissa Marr, Videogames
Grow Up: Games Players Can't Refuse?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2005, at B1 ("Videogame
players are used to slipping into the skins of their favorite movie characters, from Harry
Potter to Spider-Man. Coming soon: games that plop players into the seedier worlds of Sonny
Corleone, Tony Montana and Dirty Harry.").
220 See Goroff, supra note 62, at 765 n.136 ("Video games are merging into movies and
animated cartoons, a trend recognized in the case law surrounding video games'
copyrightability."); Li, supra note 79, at 477 ("Hollywood and the video game industry have
apparently formed a symbiotic relationship, with the former producing movies based on video
games and the latter developing games based on movies.'); Don Clark, Videogames Get Real:
Advanced Graphics Chips Make Features More Lifelike; Closing the Gap With Film, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 14, 2004, at B1 ("As graphics chips become more powerful, the hardware movie
studios and game makers use eventually could become the same, allowing them to swap
scenes and characters."); Robert A. Guth & Merissa Marr, Videogames Go Hollywood:
Coveting Rich Profit Source, Studios Seek Greater Control Over Titles Based on Films, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 2004, at Bi ("As games include increasingly better graphics and more-detailed
story lines, they have become great vehicles for extending movie franchises. Studios now let
game makers participate in the early stages of movie development so game and movie can be
created in tandem."). Further, certain "Hollywood agents" have "either set up videogame
divisions or dispatched agents to drum up new business from the tightening connection
between movies and games." Guth & Marr, supra.
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Wars: Episode Il-Attack of the Clones,"' consisted almost entirely
of computer-generated images.222 Much of the "acting" in the film
(in the conventional sense of the word) took place in front of screens
onto which computer-generated images were later added.223
Similarly, films starring a character who originated in the world of
interactive video games have now been created.224
B. VIDEO GAMES AS UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Expanding the category of "obscenity" to include violent imagery
or the category of "incitement" to include expression outside the
Brandenburg and Hess test would undermine important social and
political interests. Speech and the free exchange of ideas and
sentiments are critical to our political system, to our development
as mature human beings, and even to our survival.225 Courts must
221 (Lucasfilm 2002).
222 See Richard Corliss & Jess Cagle, Dark Victory: An Inside Look at the New "Star
Wars" Episode: How the Young Darth Vader Fell in Love and George Lucas Rediscovered the
Heart and Soul of His Epic Series, TIME, Apr. 29, 2002, at 56, 61 ("CLONES is populated with
hundreds of computer-generated creatures.").
223 See Stephen Schaefer, Life As a Jedi; Hayden Christensen is Ready to Take a Walk on
the Dark Side in 'Star Wars' Prequels, BOSTON HERALD, May 15, 2002, at 53 (quoting
Christensen as saying "[flor the most part a lot of blue screens are involved," and noting that
"[a]cting in front of the blue screen allows George Lucas to fill the space with as many
creatures and [sets] as he can imagine"). In fact, even the extent to which such screens will
remain necessary is a matter of debate:
Thanks to digital technology, seeing is no longer believing in movies,
even to the tiny degree it once was.
Not-really-there computer-generated characters are popping up more
and more. Films this spring (2002] will feature a new crop, including the
crime-fighting cartoon dog of Scooby-Doo, the swinging stunt double in
Spider-Man, and the much-hated Jar Jar Binks in Star Wars: Episode
II-Attack of the Clones.
Filmmakers may soon be faced with their own version of the cloning
debate. When computer graphics imaging (CGI) becomes detailed enough,
and when voice synthesis software becomes smooth enough, the next crop
of such characters could look and sound more realistic, maybe even
passably human.
Dave Kehr, Who Needs Human Actors? As Digital Characters Become More Real, Advances
in Technology Threaten to Make Actual People Obsolete in Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT,
Mar. 11, 2002, at 24.
224 See Alex Pham, Virtual Video Star Lara Croft Wins a Real-life L.A. Agent: Action
Heroine a Moneymaker, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 2002, Business, at 4 (noting that Lara Croft is
"the star of five video games, a comic book series and an eponymous Hollywood film").
22 Cf. John Mintz, Homeland Security Employs Imagination: Outsiders Help Devise
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therefore construe the protective scope of the First Amendment as
broadly as possible, subject only to the need to maintain minimum
standards of order. In addition, courts must provide clear rules and
safe harbors so as to minimize the chill of liability and regulation.
A number of noted scholars, however, have advocated a limited
scope for the First Amendment. Some, for example, have argued
that a First Amendment not limited to protecting political speech
lacks an organizing principle. 226 According to Judge Bork, because
the attributes of non-political expression are "indistinguishable from
the functions or benefits of all other human activity, ''2 7 such
expression cannot be protected under the Constitution without
granting protection for similarly situated non-expressive activity.
28
He elaborates on this point as follows:
An individual may develop his faculties or derive
pleasure from trading on the stock market, following his
profession as a river port pilot, working as a barmaid,
engaging in sexual activity, playing tennis, rigging
prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors....
[Only] the 'discovery and spread of political truth' . . .
[distinguishes speech] from any other form of human
activity.229
Professor Sunstein has made a similar argument, articulating both
an opposition to judicial aggrandizement and a concern for
promoting discourse of the highest quality.23 ° Still others have
Possible Terrorism Plots, WASH. POST, June 18, 2004, at A27 ('The Department of Homeland
Security, given the difficult task of trying to divine al Qaeda's future methods of attack on the
United States, is seeking advice from some unexpected sources these days: futurists,
philosophers, software programmers, a pop musician and a thriller writer.").
226 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 37, at 28 (arguing that any line between protected and
unprotected speech not drawn at explicitly political speech will always be arbitrary).
227 Id. at 25.
228 See id. at 26 (arguing only political speech should be preferred to other "claimed
freedoms" because only it is concerned with social welfare rather than personal gratification).
229 Id. at 25-26; see also Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 302 (1978) (arguing
that only relationship between political speech and representative democracy allows
protecting expression, but recognizing that other "pragmatic" concerns often justify protecting
broader forms of speech).
2"o See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 304 ("If autonomy in the abstract is the principle, there
2005]
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argued that a First Amendment that protects too much will
ultimately fail to protect unorthodox speech, which the Framers
intended the Amendment to protect above all.231
Conversely, a number of commentators have defended an
expansive reading of the First Amendment. Professor Baker, for
example, has argued famously in favor of a First Amendment that
maximizes individual self-expression, eschewing reliance upon the
metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas" or the search for objective
truth.232 Given the possibilities of expression in any medium,
Baker's approach would necessarily grant the First Amendment a
broad scope. Similarly, Professor Redish has argued that the First
Amendment should protect "all forms of expression that further the
self-realization value," which he justifies as an implicit and
comprehensive premise of our political system.233  Others,
meanwhile, have advocated a broad expanse for the First
Amendment, either on the ground that line-drawing is ultimately
arbitrary and therefore distorting to the expressive process,234 or on
the ground that broad freedom of expression enables disgruntled
individuals to express their displeasure with the status quo.23 5
appears to be nothing distinctive about speech to explain why it has been singled out for
constitutional protection."). Professor Sunstein argues that "[tihe current state of free speech
in America owes a great deal to extremely aggressive interpretations by the Supreme
Court .... These decisions cannot be justified by reference to the original understanding of
the First Amendment. Such decisions also involve a highly intrusive judicial role in
majoritarian politics." Id. at 256. Further, "[i]f we regard the First Amendment as an effort
to ensure that people are not prevented from speaking, especially on issues of public
importance, then current free speech law seems ill-adapted to current conditions." Id. at 271.
231 See Blasi, supra note 37, at 479 (arguing for "carefully confined ambit" of protected
speech limited to forms traditionally considered essential to maintaining open society); see
also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26
(1948) ("It is [the] mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First
Amendment to the Constitution is directed.").
232 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 966 (1978).
23 Redish, supra note 3, at 594.
234 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975) (arguing
that, in evaluating expressive conduct, "[a]ttempts to determine which element'predominates'
will therefore inevitably degenerate into question-begging judgments about whether the
activity should be protected").
... See Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment
Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 949 (1978) ('There is cathartic value in having speakers
who might otherwise become dangerous release their tensions through verbal violence rather
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Needless to say, all the foregoing scholars raise important points,
and many of these points pertain to the subject matter of this
Article. Nevertheless, the justification for an expansive reading of
the First Amendment may be considerably less doctrinally pure
than any of them suggest. First, the text of the amendment is not
limited to any one form of speech.23 To say that a person has a
right to talk about politics but not to recite poetry under the original
understanding of the First Amendment is to derogate from the plain
meaning of the provision. Of course, "speech" has a literal
meaning that does not include dance, painting, music, or sculpture,
particularly when juxtaposed with another constitutional provision
that protects "the press, 2 8 but this bridge is crossed without any
reference to the distinction between political and non-political
speech. Moreover, the presence of the Religion Clauses in the First
Amendment strongly suggests that the Framers were not thinking
solely in terms of politics when they proposed the Amendment.239
Second, the Court has been expanding the protective scope of the
First Amendment for a number of years, with at least the implicit
support of the population. Stare decisis may not count for
everything, but it certainly counts for something;24 ° were the people
of the United States to wake up tomorrow and learn that the
Supreme Court had deprived Rambo of constitutional protection,
many would be understandably astonished.241
than physical violence.").
236 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech ...").
237 See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1234-35 (1984) (citing David
A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 463-64 (1983)) (noting
that founders perceived prior restraints "as an interference with freedom of the press whether
or not the restrained publication was political in character").
2U U.S. CONST. amend. I.
239 See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 39-42
(2000) (noting the importance of "freedom of conscience" to Framers of Religion Clauses).
240 See Shiffrin, supra note 237, at 1235 (criticizing Robert H. Bork and Lillian BeVier for
undervaluing importance of precedent).
241 Cf. Nick Wingfield, Holiday Mayhem, Videogame-Style: Our Guide to the Releases
Aimed at Year-End Gift-Givers: Downloading Camouflage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2004, at D1
("According to a game industry trade group, almost one in three Americans plans to give a




Third, and perhaps most important, broad First Amendment
protection arguably serves an acute cultural need that did not exist
a century ago. As any student of modern history can attest, ours
has become a heavily regulated country in which many endeavors
constitutive of the self are subject to hurdles and barriers to entry.
People cannot generally slaughter cattle in their backyards.2 42 They
can, however, live expansive lives of fantasy constructed almost
entirely with ink, oil, or bytes.243
In the last one hundred years, the United States has witnessed
a massive shift in lifestyle, transforming from an economy that was
largely agrarian, industrial, and unrestrained-and in which liberty
in the economic realm was not only possible but exalted-to an
economy that is decidedly urban and closely regulated, where
individual economic behavior is subject to very real constraints.
This state of affairs puts a premium on identifying realms in which
individuals can grow without restraint and without discernible
harm to themselves or others. Indeed, some of the Supreme Court's
own decisions have arguably accelerated this process.
Although it began as early as 1873,244 by the middle of the
twentieth century the Court had completed its project of enabling
government to subject economic conduct to pervasive regulation.245
Indeed, the very provenance of "liberty of contract" had been
242 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (upholding law requiring
cattle to be slaughtered at designated slaughter houses).
241 See Goroff, supra note 62, at 765 ("While people cannot save a princess from a dragon
in reality, they can rescue her through Dragon's Lair."); Rachel Nielsen, Their Own World:
Online Role-Playing Games Offer Players Interaction in a Fantasy World. Who are These
People, Anyway?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at R12 (discussing online role-playing games and
characters players assume). For example,
Dark Asmodius is a character [Matt) Blevins assumes while playing an
online game called Neocron, an example of an increasingly popular kind
of interactive entertainment known as massively multiplayer online role-
playing games, or MMORPGs. Such games provide fantastical digitally
rendered landscapes in which players roam about and interact through
animated characters, or avatars.
Nielsen, supra. Nielsen notes that '"U.S. subscribers to such games have soared to about 2.4
million [in 2003] from 1.4 million in 2002, and are expected to hit 2.8 million [in 2004]." Id.
244 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 63 (upholding regulation of
butchering against Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges).
245 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)) (upholding minimum wage law for women).
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questioned.246  The rejection of economic substantive due process
materially, if not radically, reduced the scope of human activity
categorically protected from regulation. Perhaps as a concomitant
of this development, while the Court minimized the bite of economic
substantive due process, it also began to show a greater willingness
to protect endeavors with a predominantly expressive component,
as Joseph Burstyn demonstrated.247 At this time, the Court also
began to protect various forms of sexual behavior from the
regulatory power of government under the rubrics of due process
and equal protection.248
In Aristotelian terms,"' perhaps the Court was seeking to
identify zones in which people could experiment and develop their
personalities in terms of enhanced character and virtue, without
causing excessive, immediate, or discernible harm to others.
Expression does not have any such effect,25 ° nor, at least to some
extent, do many forms of consensual sexual behavior. If the
government was going to control almost every aspect of the factory2"'
246 See id. at 391 ("In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage
regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.").
247 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding
that sterilization for repeat offenders of crimes against moral turpitude violates Equal
Protection Clause).
249 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 13, in CLASSICS OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 226 (Stephen M. Cahn ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans., Hackett 3d ed. 1977)
("Happiness [is] an activity of the soul in conformity with perfect goodness."); see also
Lawrence B. Solum, Symposium on Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional
Order: Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 116 (1990) (noting that, per Aristotle,
development of virtues is, in part, function of their exercise).
20 See Redish, supra note 3, at 601 (arguing that speech has greater protection than
conduct because expression is less likely to directly harm interests of others); Shiffrin, supra
note 237, at 1238-39 (quoting R. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 645, 734 n.344) (arguing that speech promotes development and happiness and
combines values in ways nonspeech activities do not).
251 Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937) (examining extent of
Congress's power to regulate relations between labor and management at factory pursuant
to its power to regulate interstate commerce). At least in theory, the states could have
undertaken regulation of business prior to 1937. Before 1937, however, such undertakings
would have been subject to effective challenge as interferences with Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce or as deprivations of liberty or property without due process of
law. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 82-89 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 3d ed. 2000) (discussing challenges to state regulation of business based on
Commerce and Due Process Clauses).
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or the farm, 1 2 and the Court was not going to stand in its way,
perhaps the Court felt a need to compensate by giving people more
room for personal development in other areas of their lives.2 5 3 In
broader terms, if the people were going to deny themselves the
liberty to slaughter cattle in their backyard, they were going to
insist on comparable immunity in some other department of their
lives. Thus, the predicate for First Amendment protection was
poised to include not only artistic expression having an outward,
although indirect, effect upon political and social thought, but also
artistic expression having a predominantly inward effect.254
Existing precedent construes the First Amendment as broadly as
possible and provides clear rules and safe harbors. For example,
Miller v. California25" and the cases decided thereunder exclude only
a narrow, fairly well-defined category of expression from
constitutional protection on the ground of obscenity. Specifically,
Miller limits the category of obscenity to works that "depict[ ] or
describe[ ], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by applicable state law,"'256 and, in fact, gives precise
examples of what this conduct can be. 7 Writers and artists have
worked under the Miller regime for decades, arguably never
252 Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120-25 (1942) (discussing extent of Congress's
power under Commerce Clause).
253 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life."). See generally Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process
and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34 (describing the
varying fortunes of economic substantive due process).
" The reader may wonder at the difference between an Aristotelian justification for the
protection of speech and a justification based on more doctrinally straightforward notions of
autonomy or liberty. The distinction, to the extent there is one, lies in the ultimate ground
for respecting individual development. Those who argue from autonomy see choice as being
preeminent, without regard to how choice is exercised. In contrast, Aristotelians think in
terms of objective good having real content, perhaps best reached in the context of maximum
individual discretion. See Michael J. Perry, Virtues and Relativism, in VIRTUE: NOMOS
XXXIV 117, 119 (John W. Chapman & William A. Galston eds., 1992) (expressing skepticism
toward "deontological claims of morality-that is, of the possibility of justifying claims about
what one morally ought to do . . . except on the basis, ultimately, of claims about the
requirements of authentic human well-being').
255 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
25 Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
257 See id. at 25 (providing examples of obscenity including representations of intercourse,
masturbation, and excretory function).
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knowing a climate in which obscenity was completely protected. A
similar claim cannot be made about art containing violent imagery.
Any attempt to expand the category of obscenity to include
violent imagery having a supposed deleterious effect on children
would run afoul of the principles underlying the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court allows states and municipalities to suppress
obscenity solely because of its offensiveness without further
instrumental justification.2" Thus, a law adopted under Miller and
its progeny is not subject to challenge for being under- or
overinclusive so long as it proscribes expression within the defined
category. A law that is justified in instrumental terms, however, is
subject to challenge on these grounds.
As noted earlier, various commentators asking courts to redefine
obscenity to include violent imagery have supported their positions
with instrumental arguments regarding the supposed effects of such
imagery on children.2 9 These proposals encourage the prohibition
of either all or some violent imagery in video games and other works
of art to which children have access. Expanding the category of
obscenity to include all violent imagery accessible to children,
however, would radically and impermissibly truncate children's
rights under the First Amendment.26 °  On the other hand,
expanding the category of obscenity to include only some violent
imagery would produce either an unconstitutionally vague statute
or one that is fatally underinclusive because it fails to account for all
of the asserted sources of the problem at issue.
Consider, for example, the argument that the First Amendment
should not protect violent imagery in video games accessible to
children because such games do not integrate normative
2" See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that concept
of obscenity premised on preventing shock to community sensibilities, not on protecting
against behavior speech might engender); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d
572,574-75 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that obscenity is prohibited because offensive, not because
it inflicts harm). This is not to say, of course, that states and municipalities may not justify
laws regulating obscenity on instrumental grounds.
259 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
260 See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th
Cir. 2003) ("In most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when the government seeks to control the flow of information to minors." (quoting
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975)); American Amusement, 244 F.3d
at 576-77 ("Children have First Amendment rights.").
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constraints.26 ' Whether or not a complete ban on violent imagery in
such games would actually serve the underlying purposes, it would
at least correspond to this argument, although it would also be
unconstitutionally overbroad.262 On the other hand, a statute or
ordinance prohibiting merely some violent imagery would need to
draw lines. These lines would need to be either specific, such as a
ban on depictions of decapitation, or operational, such as a ban on
any depiction of violence not accompanied by adequate normative
restraints. The former would be both arbitrary and underinclusive
for not corresponding to the theory by which the regulation is
justified, whereas the latter would be impermissibly vague.
Similar arguments can be made in defense of Brandenburg and
Hess, which provide strong and certain protection and exclude from
the scope of the First Amendment only a narrow, well-defined
category of speech posing an acute threat to order and safety.
Because these cases require a degree of scienter that no writer or
artist would unwittingly possess or display, Brandenburg and Hess
give broad license to the creative process and provide artists and
writers with a high degree of control over potential liability. Given
the nature of our media, a more expansive definition of
incitement-particularly one that would conflate "direction" and
"intent" with "likelihood" by construing the first and second of these
terms to include subjective awareness of the possibility of a
particular result-would leave creators of works containing violent
imagery with few if any means to avoid an almost permanent threat
of liability. In addition, the requirement that the lawless conduct be
"imminent"'263 serves an important independent purpose by
foreclosing liability where so much time has passed that no
reasonable factfinder could isolate the legal cause of the act at issue.
The variable definitions of incitement proposed by various
commentators deny protection to works that, in their view, contain
too much violent content.264 Like variable definitions of obscenity,
the suggested incitement definitions would not provide sufficiently
261 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
263 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
264 See, e.g., Kiernan, supra note 5, at 236 (arguing that more lenient standards should
be applied in deciding whether video games containing violent imagery constitute incitement).
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clear and broad protection for makers of video games, nor for
makers of any work containing violent imagery.265 A popular video
game will be played, shared, and perhaps modified by millions of
people, young and old, whose reactions will vary substantially. In
addition, many of these people will play more than one game and
will also encounter violent imagery in books, music, movies, and TV
shows. Finally, each of these individuals will be subject to a unique
menu of strains arising from the ordinary and extraordinary
incidents of life. Given these considerations and the impossibility
of determining which "effect," if any, causes a child to commit a
violent act, makers of video games and other works containing
violent imagery could not possibly prevent violent, idiosyncratic
reactions to their works without substantially impairing children's
rights under the First Amendment or adults' access to such
media.266
For similar reasons, a jury asked to decide whether a particular
video game was the proximate and actual cause of a plaintiff's
injuries would have no discernible standard for imposing or refusing
to impose liability.267 This would inevitably expose the creators of
games to subjective assessments of the expressive value of their
works or to subjective desires to compensate plaintiffs for tragic
injuries without regard to any finding of fault. In other words,
because video games are widely available, and in the end
unavoidably so, and because many games contain violent imagery,
plaintiffs could frequently claim that a video game was the legal
cause of an act of teenage violence. In the absence of clear
constitutional rules precluding liability, such claims would expose
265 See Amanda Harmon Cooley, They Fought the Law and the Law (Rightfully) Won: The
Unsuccessful Battle to Impose Tort Liability upon Media Defendants for Violent Acts of
Mimicry Committed by Teenage Viewers, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 203, 229-30 (2004)
(discussing alternative theories of liability and constitutional protection and arguing that
"[t]he central weakness of all these policy arguments is that they run contrary to established
First Amendment jurisprudence and blackletter negligence law").
266 See Li, supra note 79, at 495 ('The specter of liability would compel publishers to 'dumb
down' their games, stripping them of sophisticated plots and characters simply to avoid
portraying violence."); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (recognizing that
protecting minors from exposure to harmful speech restricts adults from exercising right to
be exposed to such speech).
267 See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 697 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting difficulty of
protecting speech in context of tort action).
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creators of video games to the permanent possibility of vexatious
discovery and crippling judgments.
Given the foregoing, it is irrelevant that Brandenburg and Hess
arose in the context of unpopular political speech, because these
cases serve an important and salutary purpose in this context as
well. Moreover, as the Supreme Court itself has observed, drawing
the line between speech that is "overtly political" and speech that is
not is a hazardous duty.26 As the Court noted in Winters and
Joseph Burstyn, almost any message is ultimately political.269
Indeed, drawing such a line calls for exactly the kind of content-
based distinctions that the Supreme Court has described as being
intolerable to the First Amendment.27 °
Nor would ex ante restrictions on access predicated on a variable
definition of incitement be any less offensive to constitutional norms
than similar restrictions predicated on a variable definition of
obscenity. Violence is a fact of life.271 Consequently, a statute or
ordinance restricting the sale or rental to a minor of any video game
containing violent imagery would inevitably suffer from one of three
fatal deficiencies: it would sweep far too broadly; it would make
arbitrary and therefore unsupportable distinctions; or it would be
272 timpermissibly vague. Would the government classify a video
game of Warner Brothers' Wile E. Coyote and the Road Runner,
complete with misfiring rockets manufactured by the Acme
Company of Walla Walla, Washington, as "gratuitously violent"?273
How about the highly popular video game Sim City, in which the
city is subject to attacks from monsters,274 or a recent "pro-bono"
game designed to teach children about starvation that requires the
28 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
29 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (recognizing film's ability
to affect behavior and attitudes); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (noting
instances of propaganda through fiction).
270 See Police Dep'tof Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[G]overnment has no
power to restrict expression because of its .. . content.").
271 See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding violence permeates various forms of entertainment).
272 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
273 See Arcade History, http://www.arcade-history.comlhistory-database.php?page=detail
&id=2237 (last visited Sept. 2, 2005) (describing Road Runner game manufactured by Atari).
274 See Overview of Sim City 4, http://simcity.ea.com/about/simcity4/overview.php (last
visited Sept. 2, 2005) (describing newest version).
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hero to "buy rice, oil and beans, then dodge blown-up bridges, land
mines and armed rebels to deliver the food"?
2 75
V. CONCLUSION: No HARM No FOUL?
The early decisions denying constitutional protection to video
games uniformly involved questions of access." 6 Consequently, the
repercussions of these decisions were somewhat limited. People
could still play the games, developers could still design and create
new ones, and the market could thrive. It is tempting, therefore, to
look back on the experience of the early 1980s with the attitude that
"all's well that ends well." We expose new media to significant and
perhaps undesirable risk, however, if we accept such thinking
without reflection. For example, after courts held that video games
did not qualify for First Amendment protection, municipalities or
states could have banned such games, and Congress could have
prohibited their shipment across state lines,27 ' provided the
government in question could justify its action as rationally related
to a legitimate public purpose.278
Furthermore, by the late 1990s, plaintiffs were bringing tort
actions against the developers and distributors of video games,
arguing that the games had proximately caused injuries to
themselves or their decedents, and asking for crippling amounts of
compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants were then
obliged to respond not only to conventional arguments sounding in
tort, but also to precedent that almost universally denied
constitutional protection to their work. They prevailed, but one
27 Michael M. Phillips, Action, Sports ... Famine: Videogame Aims to Teach Kids About
Fighting Hunger; Project Seeks Industry Help, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2004, at B1.
276 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
277 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (holding Congress may ban goods
it considers injurious to public health, morals, or welfare from interstate commerce).
27 E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). The Court noted
that:
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.
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cannot be sure that the developers of the next new medium would
be similarly successful.
Of course, it may be that courts might have handled the
constitutional issue differently if faced with an outright ban or a tort
action with millions or even billions of dollars at stake, but one
should note that Mutual Film complained to no avail that Ohio's
scheme rendered the distribution of films in that state commercially
impracticable." 9 Indeed, in a highly prescient article published in
1984, David B. Goroff argued that courts should extend the
protection of the First Amendment to video games if only because of
their potential for expression in the coming years.28 ° The Supreme
Court itself has emphasized that a basic policy of the First
Amendment is to encourage emerging means of expression.2"' If
only for this reason, courts should be significantly more solicitous of
the claims of new media to constitutional protection.
279 See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 234 (1915) ("It is...
physically impossible for the board to censor the films with such rapidity as to enable
complainant to proceed with its business... !).
'0 Goroff, supra note 62, at 752 ("Freezing the first amendment in a particular time frame
diminishes the vitality of free speech.... To protect peep shows because their purveyors call
them 'movies' and the bump-and-grind because its performers say they are 'dancing,' while
denying video games protection because they are unlike previously recognized expression, is
nonsensical.').
2"1 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). The Court
noted that
[t]he Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments,
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be
formed, tested, and expressed .... Technology expands the capacity to
choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the
Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.
